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A POSITIVE DEFENSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
PREEMPTION 
Joshua Hawkes∗ & Mark Seidenfeld**  
INTRODUCTION 
Several years ago one of us coauthored an article entitled Administra-
tive Law’s Federalism suggesting that, from a functionalist perspective, 
administrative agencies might be preferable to Congress as the primary 
locus for federal preemption of state law.1 That article argued that agency 
rulemaking is more transparent, deliberative, and accountable than Con-
gress’s legislative process.2 It therefore suggested that, even without specif-
ic statutory authority, an agency should be able to preempt state law by 
issuing rules authorized by its organic statute.3 The article prompted a re-
sponse by Professors Ernie Young and Stuart Benjamin, in which they 
characterized it as “giv[ing] zero attention to claims that the Constitution 
may simply require Congress to make [calls that intrude on state regulatory 
authority].”4  
More recently, Professor David Rubenstein wrote an article contend-
ing that, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, acts of adminis-
trative agencies cannot have preemptive effect on state law.5 Rubenstein 
relied on an earlier work by Professor Bradford Clark, who used an 
originalist perspective to support a structural argument that the Supremacy 
Clause limits the scope of preemptive federal law to the Constitution, to 
statutes passed by Congress, or to treaties negotiated by the president and 
ratified by two-thirds of senators.6  
Clark himself had reasoned that agency regulations are not exercises 
of legislative authority, and therefore their preemptive effect, if any, must 
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 1 Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, 
and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1938-39 (2008). 
 2 Id. at 1948-83. 
 3 Id. at 2008. 
 4 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative Federal-
ism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2119 (2008) (emphasis omitted). 
 5 David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2012). 
 6 Id. at 1154 (citing Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1332-36 (2001)). 
 64 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 22:1 
derive from the statute authorizing such action rather than from the action 
itself.7 Although the precise implications of Clark’s position are unclear, 
unlike Rubenstein, he envisions that administrative action can preempt con-
flicting state law.8 In fact, Clark suggests that to determine whether an 
agency regulation trumps inconsistent state law, one need only evaluate 
whether the agency was statutorily authorized to adopt that regulation.9 But, 
as made clear below, this proposition stands in tension with the principle 
that preemptive effect must come from the underlying statute. 10  
Clark does not explicitly address whether, under his reading of the Su-
premacy Clause, Congress can statutorily delegate to an agency the authori-
ty to preclude state regulation of a particular matter on which the agency 
has not adopted any substantively conflicting regulation. His discussion of 
the nondelegation doctrine, however, suggests that he would view such a 
statute as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.11 In any 
case, both Rubenstein and Clark would reject the suggestion in Administra-
tive Law’s Federalism that agencies should have the power explicitly to 
prohibit state regulation as part of their ordinary substantive rulemaking 
authority.  
In light of this scholarship, this Article provides a positive law defense 
of the position staked out in Administrative Law’s Federalism—that as a 
matter of constitutional law, agencies with substantive rulemaking authority 
should be viewed as having the power to preempt state law without either 
their organic statutes explicitly providing for this preemption or Congress 
explicitly delegating preemptive discretion to the agencies. Part I of this 
Article addresses Clark and Rubenstein’s arguments for their respective 
positions. Part II develops the implications of our positive argument for 
administrative preemption power independent of congressional intent, de-
scribing the bounds of preemption that can attach to federal regulatory ac-
tions.  
I. THE POWER OF AGENCIES TO PREEMPT UNDER THE SUPREMACY  
CLAUSE 
Section A of this Part lays out basic preemption doctrine. Section B 
then engages Clark and Rubenstein on their own originalist turf, addressing 
the textual and intentionalist arguments for their respective positions. Sec-
tion C further develops the functional implications of those positions, and 
  
 7 Clark, supra note 6, at 1430-31. 
 8 See id. at 1431-33.  
 9 See id. at 1434-35. 
 10 See infra Part I.B.3 (discussing tension in Clark’s position that agency action preempts conflict-
ing state law). 
 11 Clark, supra note 6, at 1431-33. 
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shows, in particular, that Rubenstein’s position is contrary to the under-
standing of the Supremacy Clause from the time of the Constitution’s ratifi-
cation. 
A. Review of Basic Preemption Doctrine 
Before describing and critiquing the positions set forth by Clark and 
Rubenstein, it is useful to clarify the various preemption categories. This 
serves the dual purposes of defining the terms used in this Article and al-
lowing a sufficiently fine-grained evaluation of Clark and Rubenstein’s 
positions.  
1. Conflict Preemption12  
Courts have recognized that when a federal law conflicts with a state 
law, the state law will be preempted.13 What constitutes conflicting law, 
however, is not always clear. The narrowest type of conflict preemption 
occurs when it is impossible for one to comply with both state and federal 
law.14 For example, if a federal environmental law prohibited an owner of a 
wetland from filling in the wetland, but a state law aimed at mosquito con-
trol required the owner to fill that wetland, the state law would be preempt-
ed because the owner cannot comply with both laws. More broadly, howev-
er, courts have recognized that conflict preemption extends to situations 
when state law would create an obstacle to effectuation of the goal of feder-
al law, even though an entity could technically comply with both laws.15 
  
 12 Clark calls conflict preemption “substantive” preemption, alluding to the fact that preemption 
comes about simply by the federal government enacting some substantive provision of law. See id. at 
1433-34. 
 13 See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109 (2000); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
66-67 (1941). 
 14 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (“A holding 
of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where 
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in inter-
state commerce.”); but see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227-29 (2000) (noting that 
preemption due to the impossibility of complying with both state and federal law “is vanishingly nar-
row”). 
 15 See Nelson, supra note 14, at 228-29 (“‘[O]bstacle preemption’ potentially covers not only 
cases in which state and federal law contradict each other, but also all other cases in which courts think 
that the effects of state law will hinder accomplishment of the purposes behind federal law.”); see also, 
e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997) (holding that the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (“ERISA”), a federal act, preempted state law that “would undermine the purpose of ERISA’s 
mandated survivor’s annuity”); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156 (1982) 
(“By further limiting the availability of an option the Board considers essential to the economic sound-
ness of the thrift industry, the State has created ‘an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
 
 66 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 22:1 
Essentially, under “obstacle preemption,” courts imply preemption based on 
the understanding that a federal law should not be read to permit states to 
mandate conduct that directly undermines the federal law’s goals.16  
2. Jurisdictional Preemption17  
In some cases, federal law forbids states from regulating certain sub-
jects altogether.18 The most straightforward jurisdictional preemption is 
what courts refer to as “express preemption,” which occurs when federal 
law expressly provides that states may not regulate the subject at issue.19 In 
addition, courts have recognized “implied jurisdictional preemption,” which 
occurs when courts find that a statute is intended to prohibit state regulation 
of a subject even though it does not expressly so provide.20 The most com-
mon form of this type of preemption is “field preemption,” which occurs 
when a court finds that federal law so pervasively regulates a subject that it 
occupies the field and could not be intended to allow states to regulate that 
subject as well.21 This is different from obstacle preemption because field 
preemption prohibits state regulation even if that regulation is consistent 
with the overall goal of the federal regulatory scheme.22 
  
full purposes and objectives’ of the due-on-sale regulation.” (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67)). Fidelity 
Federal also made clear that “[f]ederal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes.” 
Id. at 153. 
 16 See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.  
 17 We borrow this term from Clark because the Court does not have a term to refer generally to 
preclusion of state regulation independent of federal substantive law on the subject. Clark, supra note 6, 
at 1433-34. More generally accepted terms for jurisdictional preemption include express and field 
preemption. See Nelson, supra note 14, at 226-27. 
 18 See, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); Hines, 312 U.S. at 62-63.  
 19 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 550-51 (2001) (finding that the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act expressly precluded states from prohibiting advertisement of 
tobacco products within 1,000 feet of a school); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 538 (1977) 
(“[I]t is the express intent of Congress to supersede any and all laws of the States . . . which are less 
stringent than . . . this title or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1461) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 20 See, e.g., Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995). 
 21 See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111 (2000) (“[The Federal Act] covers ‘design, 
construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and man-
ning’ of tanker vessels. Congress has left no room for state regulation of these matters.” (citation omit-
ted) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a))); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1983) (concluding that “the Federal Government has occupied the 
entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States.”). 
 22 See Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915) 
(“When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposi-
tion, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen 
fit to go.”). 
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B. The Extent of “Laws of the United States” Made in Pursuance of  
the Constitution 
This section discusses the structural and textual arguments that Clark 
and Rubenstein use to support their respective limitations on the power of 
administrative action to preempt state law. To do so, it is helpful to start 
with the text of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing.23 
1. Structural Arguments Regarding Meaning of “Laws of the  
United States” 
Clark argues that the Supremacy Clause incorporates a limitation on 
the type of federal law that can preempt state law.24 In particular, he con-
tends that the history of the Supremacy Clause suggests that the drafters of 
the Constitution intended to allow only those actions of the federal govern-
ment that involve significant participation and approval by the Senate to 
have preemptive power.25 Senate involvement, he argues, was a means of 
ensuring that state legislatures could protect their laws from federal 
preemption.26 Based on this thesis, Clark claims that the term “Laws of the 
United States” in the Supremacy Clause means statutes passed by Con-
gress.27  
Clark supports his thesis by noting that the Constitutional Convention 
rejected proposals allowing either the federal legislature or executive to 
negate state laws as either saw appropriate.28 Initially, the Virginia Plan 
proposed that representation of both houses of the legislature be appor-
tioned by “[q]uotas of contribution, or . . . the number of free inhabitants” 
in each state.29 The Virginia Plan, supported by the large states, also pro-
  
 23 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 24 Clark, supra note 6, at 1329-31. 
 25 Id. at 1347, 1365. 
 26 Id. at 1330-31. 
 27 Id. at 1331 (“[T]he Founders understood constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures to 
establish the exclusive means of adopting ‘the supreme Law of the Land.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 
VI, cl. 2)). 
 28 Id. at 1351-55. 
 29 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 15, 20 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S 
RECORDS]. 
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vided for the legislature to negate state laws that it determined to be incom-
patible with the articles of the union.30 The Convention rejected both as-
pects of the plan.31 The specific rejection of the provision allowing the fed-
eral legislature to negate state laws represented an important stand against 
allowing large states to control the governing of small states.32  
Small states responded with the New Jersey Plan, under which the leg-
islature would consist of a single house, with one representative from each 
state.33 In addition, the New Jersey Plan would declare “Acts of the 
U[nited] States in Cong[res]s” to be the “supreme law of the respective 
States.”34 The Convention also rejected the New Jersey Plan.35 With respect 
to representation, the Convention instead adopted the Great Compromise.36 
The Great Compromise mandated that each state would receive an equal 
number of senators, chosen by the state legislature, to represent it in the 
Senate, while each state’s representation in the House of Representatives 
would be proportional to its population.37 Just one day after the Great Com-
promise, the Convention adopted the initial version of what became the 
Supremacy Clause.38  
Clark argues that the Supremacy Clause ultimately adopted is substan-
tively identical to the supremacy provision in the New Jersey Plan,39 which 
clearly had been meant to protect states from federal legislative encroach-
  
 30 Id. at 21. 
 31 See discussion infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
 32 See discussion infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
 33 See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 15, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 29, at 242, 242-45. 
 34 Id. at 245. 
 35 Journal of the Constitutional Convention (June 19, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra 
note 29, at 312, 312-13. 
 36 See Rufus King, Memorandum (July 15, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 29, at 
12, 12-14; Journal of the Constitutional Convention (June 21, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra 
note 29, at 353-54. 
 37 Journal of the Constitutional Convention (July 16, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra 
note 29, at 13, 13-14. Later in the Convention, the framers set the number of senators per state at two. 
Journal of the Constitutional Convention (July 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 29, at 
85. 
 38 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 29, at 25, 28-29. The precise language of the provision moved by Luther Martin 
and adopted without debate read,  
Resolved that the legislative acts of the United States made by virtue and in pursuance of the 
articles of Union and all Treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States 
shall be the supreme law of the respective States as far as those acts or Treaties shall relate to 
the said States, or their Citizens and Inhabitants—and that the Judiciaries of the several 
States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the indi-
vidual States to the contrary notwithstanding . . . .  
Journal of the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 29, at 
21, 22.  
 39 Clark, supra note 6, at 1354.  
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ment.40 That plan would have made statutes enacted by Congress and trea-
ties into which the United States entered the supreme law governing states. 
It would have left to the courts (primarily state courts in the first instance) 
the role of determining whether these sources of federal law conflicted with 
state law.41 He notes that after the adoption of the Supremacy Clause, the 
Convention added the Constitution as a source of federal law that could 
preempt state law.42 He claims that this addition also supports his thesis, 
because it takes a two-thirds vote of both the Senate and the House to pro-
pose a constitutional amendment, in addition to ratification by legislatures 
of three quarters of all states.43 Hence he concludes that, by requiring that 
only federal action subject to the approval of at least a majority of the Sen-
ate could preempt state law, “the small states lost the war (between the Vir-
ginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan), but won the battle (between the con-
gressional negative and the Supremacy Clause).”44 
Although Clark’s thesis is attractive, there are weaknesses in his con-
clusion that the drafters meant for all preemptive federal law to be approved 
by the Senate.45 Perhaps the most overarching problem with Clark’s argu-
ment is that he interprets provisions for making law of various types as hav-
ing been intended primarily to protect states from federal encroachment.46 
But the most straightforward understanding of those provisions was simply 
to procedurally burden federal lawmaking, and thereby to encourage delib-
erate consideration of the interests of minority factions,47 with the effect on 
state power being secondary.  
There are also reasons to question Clark’s particular argument that the 
Supremacy Clause was meant as a limit on federal power. First, Clark at-
tributes rejection of congressional negation of state law to small states’ 
concerns that the more populous states would negate their laws as the larger 
states saw fit.48 But by the time the Supremacy Clause was first incorpo-
rated into the draft of the Constitution, the Great Compromise had occurred 
  
 40 Interestingly, despite strong state protections, the supremacy provision of the New Jersey Plan 
also authorized the federal executive to call forth the powers of the “Confederated States” to enforce and 
compel the obedience of states and individuals to legislative acts. Madison, supra note 33, at 242-45. 
 41 Clark, supra note 6, at 1351. 
 42 Id. at 1354.  
 43 See id. at 1366-67. 
 44 Id. at 1354. 
 45 Id. at 1358.  
 46 See id. at 1366.  
 47 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Bantam Books 1982) (“It is of great 
importance in a republic . . . to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 320 (James Madison) (Bantam Books 1982) (suggesting the Senate would 
provide “auxiliary precautions” against “violent passions” and “unjust measures”).   
 48 See Clark, supra note 6, at 1353 (“[D]elegates from the smaller states voiced strong opposition 
to giving the national legislature even a limited negative over state law. These members regarded the 
congressional negative as both unnecessary and impracticable.”). 
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and the small states were guaranteed equal representation in the Senate.49 
Hence, the larger states had as much to fear from small states negating their 
laws. The August 23 debate in the Convention indicates that preemption of 
state law no longer seemed to reflect a battle between large and small states. 
Charles Pinkney from the small state of South Carolina proposed a resur-
rection of the negative, while Gouverneur Morris from the large state of 
Pennsylvania argued against it.50 The proposal was voted down with the 
large state of Massachusetts voting against and the small state of New 
Hampshire voting in favor.51 
Second, given equal representation in the Senate, congressional nega-
tion would have provided more protection of state laws than the Supremacy 
Clause.52 The Great Compromise was recognized as creating significant 
legislative inertia, impeding Congress’s ability to enact federal statutes.53 
The fact that the small states would control the Senate while the large states 
would control the House suggests that Congress would almost never have 
sufficient votes to negate state law, except perhaps obvious and egregious 
efforts by states to gain a strategic advantage over their sister states.54 The 
courts, however, would provide a ready forum for anyone aggrieved by a 
state law that the litigant felt contradicted valid federal law. Moreover, de-
spite the language limiting preemption to federal action requiring Senate 
participation, Gouverneur Morris at least suggested that courts would be 
free to strike down state law “that ought to be negatived” without resorting 
to federal law.55 Hence, the framers must have recognized that the likeli-
hood of Congress enacting federal law negating a state law was much lower 
than the likelihood that a court would negate state law under the Supremacy 
Clause.  
  
 49 Journal of the Constitutional Convention, supra note 38, at 22. 
 50 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 29, at 384, 390-91. 
 51 Id. at 391.  
 52 In battles between large and small states, congressional negation would seem to provide greater 
protection to small states given equal representation in the Senate because (1) senators were directly 
accountable to state legislatures and thereby the politically powerful in the states, and (2) the inertia 
built into the legislative processes would make passage of any negatory statute more difficult than 
raising preemption in a lawsuit. 
 53 See Clark, supra note 6, at 1344-45 (noting that bicameralism and presentment help protect 
states interests because of the influence states have in the Senate and over presidential elections); Ernest 
A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 
TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1609 (2000) (“[T]he ultimate political safeguard [of federalism] may be the proce-
dural gauntlet that any legislative proposal must run and the concomitant difficulty of overcoming 
legislative inertia.”). 
 54 Cf. Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better Than One?, 12 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 145, 156-57 (1992) (noting that bicameralism with diverse constituencies in each house will 
discourage special interest legislation, but is more apt to allow genuinely majority-supported legislation 
than would a supermajority requirement). 
 55 Madison, supra note 38, at 28. 
 2014] POSITIVE DEFENSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PREEMPTION 71 
Thus, perhaps adoption of the judicially enforceable Supremacy 
Clause was seen not as a means to protect small states, but rather as further-
ing some other goal. One of the major impetuses for the Convention was 
the prevalence of state actions that compromised the welfare of the United 
States as a whole under the Articles of Confederation.56 The Convention 
wanted a mechanism capable of voiding such actions—that is, a mechanism 
to protect the federal system from the efforts of states to give themselves 
unfair advantages vis-à-vis their fellow states.57 Given the understanding, 
even during the earliest days of the United States, that administrative dis-
cretion is necessary for government to operate,58 one can reasonably posit 
that the framers envisioned federal preemption by executive action.  
2. Textual Arguments Regarding Meaning of “Laws of the  
United States” 
Both Clark and Rubenstein attribute little significance to the fact that 
the drafters of the Supremacy Clause changed the federal action capable of 
triggering preemption from “Acts of the Legislature of the United States 
made in pursuance of this Constitution” to “laws of the U. S. made in pur-
suance [of the Constitution].”59 Each views this change as only stylistic and 
claims that the clause was meant to keep its prior construction, referring 
only to acts of the federal legislature.60 But, as Professor Peter Strauss has 
pointed out, the most straightforward reading of the text would support a 
broader reading of the word “laws” than that given it by Clark and Ru-
benstein.61 There seems to be no debate that problematic common law 
  
 56 Jim Chen, Filburn’s Forgotten Footnote—Of Farm Team Federalism and Its Fate, 82 MINN. L. 
REV. 249, 261 (1997) (“[E]conomic war among the states, after all, was the impetus for union: ‘If there 
was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution, it was to keep the com-
mercial intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints.’” (quoting Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 231 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring in the judgment))). 
 57 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 194 (James Madison) (Bantam Books 1982) (“It is true that in 
controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to 
decide, is to be established under the general Government. . . . Some such tribunal is clearly essential to 
prevent an appeal to the sword, and a dissolution of the compact . . . .”). 
 58 See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 45-49 (2012) (detailing various delegations of 
executive discretion during the initial Federalist period of the United States). 
 59 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 29, at 177, 183 (showing earlier “Acts” language); Madison, supra note 50, at 389 
(quoting another source) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60 Clark, supra note 6, at 1365 (characterizing the change as incidental to the addition of the 
Constitution to those documents that would be the supreme law of the land); Rubenstein, supra note 5, 
at 1154 (misattributing the change to the Committee of Detail, and stating that there is no evidence to 
suggest that the change was “anything other than stylistic”). 
 61 Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1568–71 (2008). 
 72 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 22:1 
edicts of state courts, laws of local governments, and actions by state execu-
tives are subject to preemption under the Supremacy Clause.62 The Suprem-
acy Clause, however, uses “Laws of any State,” to describe those actions of 
state and local government that would be preempted by supreme federal 
law.63 Thus, it seems that the most consistent reading of the Clause would 
understand “Laws of the United States,” like “Laws of any State,” to refer 
to more than statutes passed by each respective legislature. In addition, the 
term “Law of the Land” later in the Clause, by its own reference to prior 
listed federal actions, includes more than just statutes.64 Hence, the framers 
seemed aware that the term “law” includes more than just statutes.  
The language of the Supremacy Clause also mirrors that of Article III, 
which provides federal jurisdiction over cases “arising under this Constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties.”65 Again, it seems obvious 
that federal jurisdiction must extend to disputes involving actions of the 
executive branch of the federal government. And no one has ever ques-
tioned such a reading of “federal question” jurisdiction.66 Thus, the most 
consistent reading of the Supremacy Clause and Article III would interpret 
“Laws of the United States” to include actions by the executive branch au-
thorized by federal statutes or the Constitution itself.  
It would also seem significant that the framers thought it important 
enough to change the language to “Laws of the United States.” “Laws” is a 
broader term that seemingly encompasses more than just statutes passed by 
the legislature. The change from “Acts” to “Laws” was made on the floor of 
the Convention, along with the explicit addition of the Constitution to the 
list of federal actions that could preempt state law.67 Both changes can be 
viewed to clarify that federal action capable of preempting includes more 
than just congressionally enacted statutes.68  
  
 62 Madison, supra note 38, at 28-29; Clark, supra note 6, at 1354 (discussing the new Supremacy 
Clause but only remarking on the addition of state constitutions when addressing the scope of state law 
subject to preemption). 
 63 See Strauss, supra note 61, at 1568-69 (“[The] second use of ‘Laws’ [in the Supremacy Clause] 
embraces state common law.”). 
 64 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
 65 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 66 Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 382-83 (1821) (“[The federal judiciary] is 
authorized to decide all cases of every description, arising under the constitution or laws of the United 
States. . . . [Furthermore, any such case] is cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be the 
parties to that case.”).  
 67 Madison, supra note 50, at 389.  
 68 This view comports with the drafting history of the Supremacy Clause, during which the fram-
ers consistently broadened the clause from Luther Martin’s initially adopted proposal. That proposal 
included language limiting preemptive effect to acts and treaties that “relate to the said States, or their 
Citizens and Inhabitants.” Journal of the Constitutional Convention, supra note 38, at 22. This limiting 
language was removed by the Committee of Detail. Compare Committee of Detail, I, in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 29, at 129, 132 (showing Martin’s language in the resolutions submitted to the 
Committee of Detail), with Madison, supra note 59, at 183 (the Supremacy Clause without Martin’s 
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Rubenstein further relies on the fact that there is no record of any dis-
cussion of the change to conclude that it was not significant.69 But the Con-
vention participants were well aware of the import of their editing actions.70 
Furthermore, the framers made numerous floor amendments without debate 
that had obvious substantive effect.71 Even edits by the Committee of Style 
likely reflected substantive elements.72  
In addition, attributing any significance to the lack of debate suffers 
from a problem similar to one originally identified by Professor Henry 
Monaghan in response to Clark’s conclusion that “Laws of the United 
States” did not include the common law decisions of the federal courts.73 
Monaghan admitted that Clark’s conclusion was probably true, although not 
for the reasons Clark gave and not with the effect of preventing Supreme 
Court decision from overruling state common law.74 Rather, common law 
was not seen as the law made by any sovereign, but some natural truth that 
  
language requiring relatedness). The broadening of the clause by the Committee may have reflected a 
compromise between the Martin language and the proposal by Charles Pinckney, which would have 
conditioned the operation of every state law on approval by Congress. Committee of Detail, III, in 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 29, at 134, 134 n.3, 135 (“But no Bill of the Legislature of any State 
shall become a law till it shall have been laid before S. &. H. D. in C. assembled and received their 
Approbation.”). 
 69 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1154-55. 
 70 See James Wilson, Remarks on the Constitution at the Convention of Pennsylvania, as reprint-
ed in 1 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 465, 467 (Harper & Bros. 1861) (“[Because of] the conflicts and 
difficulties which must arise from the many and powerful causes [participating at the Convention] . . . it 
is hopeless and impracticable to form a constitution which, in every part, will be acceptable to every 
citizen, or even to every government, in the United States; and that all which can be expected is, to form 
such a constitution as, upon the whole, is the best that can possibly be obtained.”).  
 71 See, e.g., James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 25, 1787), in 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 29, at 412, 417 (adding to the Supremacy Clause treaties “which shall 
be made” (internal quotation marks omitted)); James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention 
(Sept. 10, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 29, at 557, 559 (making two-thirds of the states 
the requirement to call a constitutional convention); James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Con-
vention (Aug. 31, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 29, at 475, 479-80 & n.13 (making nine 
states the requirement to ratify and “commenc[e] proceedings under this Constitution” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
 72 Some edits by the Committee on Style were even seen at the time of ratification as communi-
cating fundamental attributes of the Constitution. For example, the Committee of Style changed the 
“supreme law of the several states” to the “supreme law of the land.” At the time, this was seen as 
signaling that the Constitution was not a confederation of states, but rather created a new country ac-
countable directly to its citizens. One newspaper published commentary that the change to “law of the 
land” signaled “the design of erecting one consolidating government universally pervading the land, and 
to be executed independant [sic] of the States and of course from necessity and on purpose abolishing 
them gradually . . . .” Luther Martin, Observations Published in the Maryland Gazette (June 3, 1788), in 
SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 291, 294-
95 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987).  
 73 Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 779 (2010).  
 74 Id. at 740-41. 
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the courts discovered.75 So although it probably would not come within the 
original understanding of the phrase “Laws of the United States made pur-
suant to the Constitution,” the Supreme Court would have understood that 
its reading of common law would trump that of state courts simply by the 
fact that the Supreme Court reviewed those courts for legal error.  
Similarly, the framers likely would not have considered it controver-
sial to include administrative action as capable of preempting state law be-
cause, at the time the Constitution was drafted, it was assumed that Con-
gress would make the major policy decisions underlying administrative 
action.76 That is, although the framers undoubtedly understood that the ex-
ecutive branch would have to exercise discretion to implement statutes,77 
the extent to which statutes authorized such discretion with respect to regu-
lation of private conduct was much more limited in 1787 than it later came 
to be understood, especially after the New Deal.78 For that reason, a lack of 
a large reaction to the change from “Acts” to “Laws” in the Supremacy 
Clause is not surprising. 
The point of this argument is that those in the framers’ time likely un-
derstood that actions of the executive branch involve exercises of discretion 
that could preempt state law, but they would not have expected such actions 
to result in outcomes far beyond those envisioned by the statute authorizing 
the action.79 In essence, what creates the concern about agency preemption 
  
 75 See id. at 741, 778-81.  
 76 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 
1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1276-77 (2006) (“Had Federalist Congresses done little, or done virtu-
ally everything via self-executing laws, the issue of political control of administration and the tech-
niques by which it might be accomplished need not have loomed large in the early Republic. But this 
was not the pattern. The sheer range of activities attended to in the congressional sessions that make up 
the first volume of the United States Statutes at Large is astonishing.”). But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1733-34 (2002) (asserting 
that the Framers were more afraid of the legislature usurping powers belonging to other branches than 
with delegation of authority to the executive).  
 77 See Madison, supra note 38, at 34 (“[I]n the administration of the [Executive Department] 
much greater latitude is left to opinion and discretion than in the administration of the [Judiciary].”); cf. 
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 466 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(despite the Constitution giving Congress the spending power, Congress has authorized the president to 
exercise discretion whether to spend on a particular item “since the founding of the Nation”).  
 78 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 
1677 (1975) (“So long as administrative power was kept within relatively narrow bounds and did not 
intrude seriously on vested private interests, the problem of agency discretion could be papered over by 
applying plausible labels, such as ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘quasi-legislative’ . . . . But after the delegation by 
New Deal Congresses of sweeping powers to a host of new agencies under legislative directives cast in 
the most general terms, the broad and novel character of agency discretion could no longer be concealed 
behind such labels.” (footnotes omitted)); cf. MASHAW, supra note 58, at 1-17 (explaining how adminis-
trative law early in our nation’s history reflected the need to build and secure the federal state as an 
entity, and less on regulating private conduct, which characterizes post New-Deal regulatory activity 
that is likely to be subject to judicial review of agency discretion). 
 79 See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1158-59.  
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of state law is not a changed perception of whether agency action falls with-
in the “Laws of the United States,” but rather the greatly increased potential 
breadth of such action.80 Although Clark elides this point, Rubenstein can-
didly admits it.81 He opines that the courts were wrong to allow statutes to 
delegate so much discretion to agencies.82 Rubenstein accepts Clark’s thesis 
that Senate involvement is crucial to preemption, but he believes that it 
should also be crucial to creation of all federal law, a proposition that is 
both at odds with current nondelegation doctrine and pragmatically impos-
sible to maintain.83 Having admitted that he lost the battle over the proper 
amount of Senate involvement necessary for the making of law, Ru-
benstein’s reading of “Laws of the United States” provides no additional 
ground to contend that somehow more Senate involvement is required for 
preemptive law.84  
3. Tensions in Clark’s Position that Administrative  
Preemption Comes from Agency Authorizing Statutes 
There is somewhat of an intellectual inconsistency in Clark’s position 
that agency regulations, being executive in nature and not “Laws of the 
United States,” cannot preempt state law in their own right, but that such 
regulations do preempt state law with which they conflict when they are 
authorized by a statute enacted by Congress.85 The major problem with 
Clark’s position stems from his supposition that Congress makes the 
preemptive decision regarding regulations when it authorizes an agency to 
regulate.86  
  
 80 Id. at 1145-46 (“[T]here is a conceptual limit to congressional delegation—but it’s virtually 
toothless in application.”). 
 81 Id. at 1143-44.  
 82 Id. at 1153-54.  
 83 Statutes cannot answer all potential questions that might arise upon application; execution of 
the law requires some level of executive discretion that in essence makes law. See Akhil Reed Amar, 
Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 672 (1996) (“[V]irtually no law specifies 
everything: almost all laws create zones of discretion, zones in which faithful execution requires good 
faith judgment and choice.”). 
 84 Rubenstein counters that the source of preemption power is the Supremacy Clause, and the 
source of power to delegate is Article I. Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1167-68. But, the Supremacy 
Clause itself ties Congress’s Article I power to preemption by specifying that laws made pursuant to the 
Constitution preempt conflicting state law. Cf. Strauss, supra note 61, at 1570 (finding persuasive 
Clark’s argument that the Supremacy Clause requires the Supreme Court to determine that federal law is 
substantively legitimate before it can preempt state law (citing Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy 
Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 116-19 (2003))). 
 85 Rubenstein essentially critiques Clark on the same grounds. See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 
1157 (“To say that Congress preempts in such cases is too far a stretch.”). We provide some needed 
details that flesh out the argument why this is so.    
 86 See id. at 1156-57. 
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When Congress enacts a statute authorizing agency regulation, it gen-
erally has some idea of the scope of the regulatory program it creates and 
might entertain a belief about whether states should have a role in it. But 
when Congress enacts legislation authorizing agency regulation, it often has 
little idea what the ultimate regulation adopted by the agency will provide.87 
Because such regulations often establish significant policies with which 
state law might conflict, Congress would have no way to envision what 
state law is preempted. It seems odd to attribute to Congress a determina-
tion of the propriety for preemption of state law when Congress would have 
no means of evaluating either the impact of preemption on state sovereignty 
or any benefits of preventing state action for the nation as a whole. Moreo-
ver, other than when statutes explicitly preempt state law, there is little evi-
dence that Congress considers the potential preemptive impact of regula-
tions when it authorizes agencies to issue them.88 This undermines Clark’s 
position that preemption derives from some affirmative exercise of con-
gressional considerations rather than from the valid regulation itself.89 
Clark’s understanding of “Laws of the United States” in the Supremacy 
Clause, taken to its logical extension, would suggest that agency regulations 
cannot preempt even state law that would conflict with or be an obstacle to 
them unless the statute authorizing the regulations explicitly provided for 
them to be preemptive. But this is not the position to which Clark sub-
scribes.90  
The tension in Clark’s position, vis-à-vis his interpretation of the Su-
premacy Clause, is compounded by the fact that statutes that do not have 
savings or preemption clauses, but that authorize an agency to issue regula-
tions, leave significant discretion to the agency to determine whether a par-
ticular regulation will conflict with state law. The agency can alter the 
preemptive effect by the nature of the substantive standard it imposes when 
it writes the regulation. For example, an agency can choose a minimal per-
formance standard, which imposes only a regulatory floor; alternatively it 
can impose something akin to a design standard, which mandates conduct 
  
 87 See Arthur W. Murphy & D. Bruce La Pierre, Nuclear “Moratorium” Legislation in the States 
and the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 434 (1976) (“Alt-
hough the precise effect of the preemption doctrine on particular state laws and regulations is frequently 
hard to predict, the resolution of conflicting assertions of authority is relatively easy where Congress has 
addressed itself to the issue of the extent to which state activity must be displaced.”). 
 88 See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1159.  
 89 See Clark, supra note 6, at 1433 (“Administrative rulemaking is suspect to the extent that it 
displaces state law without adhering to the constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures designed 
to safeguard federalism. If the underlying statute defines the scope of preemption, then this objection 
disappears. . . . [C]ourts should displace state law only when the statute itself requires that result.”). 
 90 Id. at 1334-36, 1434.  
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or outcomes with more particularity.91 Regulatory floors leave room for 
state law to impose stricter standards; design standards do not.92  
4. Rubenstein’s Gambit Arguing that Administrative Action Can 
Never Preempt State Law 
Rubenstein avoids the tension between Clark’s reading of the Suprem-
acy Clause and his position on the preemptive impact of agency action by 
carrying Clark’s reading of the Supremacy Clause to its logical conclusion 
with respect to the preemptive effect of agency action.93 As a result, Ru-
benstein reasons that agency action can have no preemptive effect, whether 
or not Congress has statutorily provided for such regulations to preempt 
state law.94 Thus, Rubenstein would hold that statutory delegation to agen-
cies to preempt state law is unconstitutional.95 In addition, he would give no 
preemptive effect to agency substantive regulations, allowing a state to pass 
laws permitting regulated entities within the state to ignore federal regula-
tions if the state so desired.96 Rubenstein’s position, however, would threat-
en the workability of the federal government. Furthermore, it is unsupport-
ed by the traditional preemptive effect given to administrative action since 
the ratification of the Constitution.  
The policy implications of Rubenstein’s position seem inconsistent 
with the problems that motivated the Constitutional Convention in 1787.97 
The framers understood the Constitution as providing mechanisms to pre-
  
 91 On the distinction between performance and design standards, see The Supreme Court, 1980 
Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 319, 327 n.57 (1981) (“A ‘performance’ standard differs from a ‘design’ stand-
ard in that the former specifies only the objective to be achieved, not the means of achieving it.”). See 
also Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health, 
Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705, 713 (2003) (“[W]hen setting standards, 
regulatory agencies usually select a point on a spectrum running from what might be considered ‘pure’ 
performance standards to ‘pure’ design standards, depending on the level of discretion afforded the 
targets of regulation.”). 
 92 See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling 
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1561-68 (2007). 
 93 See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1155. 
 94 Id. at 1164-65 (“[A] system without delegated supremacy is not only more consistent with the 
framers’ vision but also conceptually feasible today.”).  
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 1165 (“Agency action cannot trump a conflicting state law. Depending on the nature of 
the conflict, a state law will either supplement or trump conflicting agency standards within that state’s 
jurisdiction.”). 
 97 Compare id. (listing the substantive implications of his proposal), with Chen, supra note 56, at 
261 (“[E]conomic war among the states, after all, was the impetus for union: ‘If there was any one 
object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution, it was to keep the commercial inter-
course among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints.’” (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 231 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring in the judgment))). 
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vent state collective action problems that were evidenced by the states’ his-
tory of behaving strategically to the detriment of the United States as a 
whole.98 Formalists like Justice Scalia, Clark, and, for the purposes of his 
article on preemption, Rubenstein tolerate the delegation of rulemaking 
authority because a “certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, 
inheres in most executive or judicial action.”99 Statutes cannot specify all 
the policy choices that are reflected in their implementation. There must be 
some slack in implementation or the policies encompassed within a statute 
could not be implemented at all.100 In other words, actions implementing a 
statute will also reflect some policy choices left unspecified by that statute. 
Rubenstein’s understanding—that states could ignore discretionary deci-
sions by agencies—would allow states to countermand virtually every fed-
eral executive action, and thereby the statute underlying such action.101 In 
Rubenstein’s system of Constitutional order, with respect to administrative 
action the Supremacy Clause would work in reverse of how it currently 
operates: federal regulations would only have the force of law if they were 
not overridden by state and local laws. To preempt state laws, agencies 
would have to present their regulations to Congress for enactment into stat-
ute.102 Given the need for executive implementation of virtually all regulato-
ry law, Rubenstein’s proposal pragmatically would substitute congressional 
negation, which the framers rejected, for the Supremacy Clause.103  
Rubenstein suggests that states generally are unlikely to attempt to ne-
gate agency regulations.104 He supports his argument by noting that, to date, 
there have been few instances of direct inconsistency between state and 
federal regulations.105 Therefore, he predicts that direct conflicts are “likely 
to be relatively rare” under his proposal.106 He also posits that states would 
hesitate to raise the ire of Congress by pushing against preemption too 
  
 98 See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of 
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 144-50 (2010) (arguing that the eighteen enumerated powers 
of Congress in Article I of the Constitution together provide a coherent set of tools to combat state 
collective action problems). 
 99 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As already noted, 
however, Rubenstein does not accept broad delegation of discretion to agencies; he merely accepts that 
the courts today are not about to prohibit them. Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1145-46. 
 100 See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 71-79 
(1983) (detailing trade-offs that occur between adopting a precise rule and a standard that leaves more 
slack in implementation). 
 101 See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1165, 1171-72. 
 102 See Strauss, supra note 61, at 1591 (explaining that Clark’s position would essentially reject 
delegation of regulatory authority to agencies “in any context impacting state law”). 
 103 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 8, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 29, at 164, 168. 
 104 See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1178-79. 
 105 Id. at 1171.  
 106 Id.  
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hard.107 Rubenstein thereby implies that states will not overly resist admin-
istrative regulation out of fear of congressional reprisal.108 He further rea-
sons that regulation requires a commitment of resources, and that states 
might not want to make that commitment.109  
With respect to congressional reprisal against states that throw 
wrenches into the implementation of federal programs, Rubenstein overes-
timates the likelihood that Congress will overcome the enormous legislative 
inertia to negate state law.110 But more fundamentally, the true threat of 
Rubenstein’s position can be gauged by some states’ recent reactions to 
federal statutes and Supreme Court constitutional holdings with which they 
disagreed.111 And by that measure, the picture is far from the one Ru-
benstein paints.  
For example, in protest of a woman’s federally protected right to 
choose to terminate her pregnancy, some states have enacted statutes that 
clearly contravene settled constitutional standards that the Supreme Court 
has given no indication it is about to change.112 Others have passed laws 
expressing opposition to federal gun control laws.113 Missouri’s state legis-
lature went so far as voting to prohibit federal officials from enforcing such 
laws in the state,114 which, but for the governor’s veto, would have set up 
the fanciful prospect of local police and sheriffs arresting federal Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives agents.115 State legislators knew 
that courts would deem these statutes unconstitutional and hence legally 
  
 107 Id. at 1178. 
 108 Id.  
 109 Id. at 1170-71.  
 110 Cf. Ernest A. Young, The Continuity of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: An Essay 
for Phil Frickey, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1390 n.114 (2010) (agreeing that congressional override of 
judicial interpretations disfavoring preemption is unlikely, but positing that for one who supports a 
strong norm of federalism, that is not a bad thing). Congressional consideration is unlikely if the matter 
is not of great national importance, and if the matter is nationally important, state resistance often will 
reflect a partisan disagreement on the issue that almost certainly would doom any legislative effort to 
override state law. 
 111 See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez & Robert Pear, Several States Undercutting Health Care Enrollment, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at A11; John Eligon & Erik Eckholm, New Laws Ban Most Abortions in 
North Dakota, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2013, at A1; Jonathan Martin, Health Law Is Dividing Republican 
Governors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013, at A14; Michael Martinez, State Battles Intensify on Access to 
Guns, CNN (Sept. 23, 2013, 6:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/12/politics/gun-control-state-by-
state/index.html; Robert Pear, Majority of Governors Refuse to Set Up Health Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 15, 2012, at A13.  
 112 See Eligon & Eckholm, supra note 111; see also MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 954 F. Supp. 
2d 900, 909 (D.N.D. 2013) (noting universal judicial rejection of recent state efforts to condition abor-
tions in a manner that creates significant barriers to their availability).  
 113 Martinez, supra note 111.  
 114 Id.  
 115 Id. (reporting that the Missouri legislature passed a measure making enforcement of federal gun 
control law illegal, but that Governor Nixon vetoed it, stating that the law was an “unnecessary and 
unconstitutional attempt to nullify federal laws” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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inoperative.116 Of course states can pass statutes that raise issues about the 
bounds of constitutional rights and the meaning of statutory provisions, 
hoping to generate cases and get judges to nudge the law in the direction 
they desire. But the examples above had no hope of being upheld upon ju-
dicial review. They were passed as symbolic statements of these legisla-
tures’ opposition to federal law.117  
If state legislatures are willing to devote the time and resources to en-
acting such symbolic legislation and legislation aimed at influencing federal 
law at the margin, one can reasonably surmise that they would be more 
emboldened if they knew that their efforts actually would negate federal 
regulations. State efforts to undermine the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) 
signal the likely resistance that states would mount if they had the power to 
override agency action.118 The great efforts to which some states have gone 
to undermine the operation of the ACA advise significant skepticism about 
Rubenstein’s suggestion that states would not lightly defy federal regula-
tions. Some states have declined hundreds of millions of federal dollars by 
refusing to expand their Medicaid coverage in accordance with the ACA.119 
Many states have refused to set up state-run insurance exchanges even 
though that refusal forfeits state input into the structure of such exchang-
es.120 And some states have adopted legally questionable, unduly burden-
some licensing requirements and restrictions on navigators, whose job is to 
help individuals sign up for health insurance on insurance exchanges.121 
These examples suggest states would likely go further than they have al-
ready to resist federal law when they have constitutional options that can 
prohibit the operation of federal regulation. 
In addition, Rubenstein argues that a prohibition on administrative 
preemption is good policy.122 He maintains that it is just as likely that uni-
form federal regulation will be inferior to an overlap of federal and state 
regulation as vice versa.123 Hence, he sees the choice of whether state law 
trumps agency regulation as a default rule that would encourage dialogue 
between agencies and states.124 He opines that agencies will not take states 
seriously in such a dialogue unless states can veto agency regulations.125  
  
 116 Cf. Eligon & Eckholm, supra note 111, at A1, A12.  
 117 See Martinez, supra note 111.  
 118 See Martin, supra note 111, at A14. 
 119 See id.; see also Alvarez & Pear, supra note 111, at A11.   
 120 See Pear, supra note 111, at A13. 
 121 See Alvarez & Pear, supra note 111, at A11; see also St. Louis Effort for Aids v. Huff, 996 F. 
Supp. 2d 798 (W.D. Mo. 2014) (finding Missouri’s licensing requirements for and regulation of health 
insurance navigators preempted by the ACA). 
 122 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1129.  
 123 Id.  
 124 Id. at 1173.  
 125 Id. at 1177. 
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This argument, however, fails to take into account the safeguards 
against arbitrary and unpopular federal regulatory action. The likelihood 
that exclusive federal regulation is better than overlapping state and federal 
authority significantly increases if the agency has deliberatively chosen to 
act in a preemptive manner.126 And federal administrative procedure, as 
well as political and judicial review of agency action, requires agencies to 
act deliberatively.127 In addition, states have significant means to protect 
their regulatory authority.128 Agency preemptive choices must survive both 
political pressure from state congressional delegations129 and arbitrary and 
capricious review from challenges brought by state officials and interest 
groups opposed to federal regulation.130 An agency decision that withstands 
both arbitrary and capricious review and political pressure, while not neces-
sarily optimal, almost always is at least justifiable in terms of both objective 
reasoning and political palatability.  
In addition, in opining that mistakes of too much and too little preemp-
tion are likely to occur equally often, Rubenstein neglects one of the most 
fundamental lessons of McCulloch v. Maryland.131 Federal and state gov-
ernments, while both representing sovereigns, do not stand in a perfectly 
reciprocal relationship.132 By undermining federal law, one state can inter-
fere with the implementation of the will of the nation, and voters in the oth-
er states, having no say over the government of the intransigent state, will 
not be able politically to influence that state’s action.133 The voters of any 
particular state, however, are represented at the federal level through Con-
gress and the election of the president.134 If they dislike federal policy, their 
recourse is to press their cause politically.  
Rubenstein might respond that states are not represented before federal 
agencies. But they are, and perhaps more so than any other interest group 
  
 126 See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1973-74.  
 127 See id. at 1939-40.  
 128 See id. at 1973 (“The states have proven to be effective at influencing agencies to preserve their 
state prerogatives.”); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 774-75 
(2004) (noting that federal agencies may hesitate to alienate state regulators because, in implementing 
federal programs, agency staff often have to cooperate with those regulators). 
 129 See Mendelson, supra note 128, at 775 (“[A]gency officials recognize the political costs that 
may come—often through the congressional process—from not taking state concerns into account.”). 
 130 Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 
1053 (2011) (“In a world of hard look review . . . political constraints are still present, yet legal and 
technocratic considerations constrain the agency as well.”). 
 131 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 132 Id. at 410. (“They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither 
sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other.”).  
 133 Id. at 431-33.  
 134 Id. at 431 (“In the legislature of the Union alone, are all represented. The legislature of the 
Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people with the power of controlling measures which 
concern all, in the confidence that it will not be abused.”).  
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affected by a wide gamut of agency decisions.135 First, they can participate 
in agency proceedings just like any other affected person.136 Second, 
through various structural mechanisms, states have direct influence on 
members of Congress,137 and agencies do not lightly ignore Congress, espe-
cially when subject to the threat of oversight hearings and appropriations 
battles.138 Third, states can have a disproportionate influence on presidential 
policies.139 For example, given the politics of electoral presidential elec-
tions, swing states wield an enormous influence on presidential policy 
  
 135 Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2075 
(2008) (“Numerous factors, such as congressional oversight, federal officials’ ties to state regulators, 
lobbying by state political organizations, and dependence on state implementation, can all serve to give 
state regulatory interests leverage in federal agency decisionmaking.”). States also have associations 
organized to represent the interests of various state and local government institutions, which are very 
effective in lobbying Capitol Hill and the White House. See Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 
1121 (1997). A more sophisticated argument is that different organizations that represent the states as an 
institution may take opposing positions or may not raise federalism concerns regarding federal agency 
regulation because their members will disagree about the desirability of such regulation. See id. at 1123-
24. But one may question the importance of “abstract federalism” interests if states are willing to sacri-
fice representation of such interests in order to pursue their policy preferences in particular agency 
proceedings. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1973 (“[T]he costs of shortchanging abstract 
federalism in most cases will be small compared to the effect of federalism on programmatic effective-
ness.”); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 903, 948 (1994) (“The term ‘states’ or ‘federalism’ becomes a code word for particular 
substantive positions, because that is what we really care about.”). 
 136 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 354 (3d ed. 2010). 
 137 Thus, the fact that each state has equal representation in the Senate goes beyond merely ensur-
ing that states’ institutional interests are likely to be considered in Congress, but supports states’ influ-
ence in administrative proceedings as well. In addition, state legislatures can influence the delegations 
they send to the House of Representatives by drawing congressional districts. Franita Tolson, Partisan 
Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 859, 902 (“[T]he ability of states to 
influence their representatives through redistricting can actually help states to protect their regulatory 
authority in the era of big government.”). Finally, congressional representatives are beholden to their 
state political party for their nominations and campaign support. Cf. Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, 
Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 362 (2010) (“[T]he political safeguards of 
federalism are arguably maintained today by the continued role of states in congressional elections, 
lobbying by organizations that represent state interests, the influence of state political party activists on 
federal lawmakers, and Congress’s recognition that the states are needed to carry out cooperative federal 
programs.”). 
 138 Congress has significant ability to limit agency policy prerogatives, especially through the 
appropriations process. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation 
Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 461-62 (asserting that use of appropriations is a potent technique by which 
Congress “asserts control over the administrative state”); see also Jason A. MacDonald, Limitation 
Riders and Congressional Influence Over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 766, 
766 (2010) ( “[A] substantial number of limitation riders are employed annually to influence substan-
tively important policy decisions . . . . ”). 
 139 See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency 
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1346 (2013). 
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choices.140 On issues that divide the country along state lines, swing states’ 
preferences often reflect middle ground positions between those of states 
that support extreme positions.141 In essence, the president’s policies are 
likely to be greatly influenced by the position of the “median” state rather 
than the median voter.142 And certainly agencies are greatly influenced by 
White House preferences.143 In short, states already can engage the agency 
in a conversation that gives them significant means to protect their interests 
when such preservation is in the national interest.  
C. Understanding of Administrative Preemption in the Early Years of  
the Nation 
Having described the textual and structural weaknesses of interpreting 
the Supremacy Clause to omit agency action from the class of federal law 
that can preempt state law, this Article now proceeds to show that preemp-
tive effect of such action was understood at the time the Constitution was 
ratified.  
1. States Taxing Power and McCulloch v. Maryland 
Since almost the inception of the United States, courts have recognized 
the need to credit discretionary actions of the federal executive branch 
against conflicting state law.144 Consider the case of McCulloch v. Mary-
land, which upheld Congress’s authority to establish the Second Bank of 
the United States, and held that Maryland could not tax the Baltimore 
  
 140 See id. (“[T]he Electoral College . . . leads to outsized influence for a handful of swing states . . 
. .”); see also Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1234 (2006) (arguing that because of the winner-take-all nature of most states’ 
systems of awarding electoral college votes, the president may have a greater tendency to favor parochi-
al policies than does Congress). 
 141 See John R. Wright, Pivotal States in the Electoral College, 1880 to 2004, 139 PUB. CHOICE 21, 
33, 35-36 (2009). 
 142 Because the Electoral College reflects the influence of states’ populations, swing states may not 
technically have as many states on one side of their position on important issues as on the other. But, by 
the same token, because the Electoral College also reflects the influence of equal representation in the 
Senate, swing states also are not likely to have states with equal populations on one side of their position 
as on the other. The point is, however, that it is the positions of states, rather than merely the people, that 
drive presidential politics. See Nzelibe, supra note 140, at 1234-42.  
 143 See, e.g., William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. POL. 
1095, 1095-96 (2002); Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 14 (1994). 
 144 MASHAW, supra note 58, at 68-69; Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with your Chevron?: Presump-
tion and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 830 (1995).  
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branch of the Bank.145 The statute creating the Bank was controversial.146 To 
protest the Bank, many states had decided to tax extensively any branch 
created in that state.147 For example, Tennessee imposed a $50,000 tax on 
any bank other than a state-chartered bank doing business in the state, and 
Kentucky passed a $60,000 annual tax on any branch of the Bank of the 
United States.148 These states thus sought to prevent the Bank of the United 
States from establishing a branch within their boundaries. 
The language of the federal statute authorizing the Bank provided that 
“it shall be lawful for the directors of the said corporation to establish offic-
es of discount and deposit, wheresoever they shall think fit, within the Unit-
ed States or the territories thereof.”149 McCulloch then has all the elements 
of Rubenstein’s problem: delegation of powers to decide where to locate 
branches of the Bank,150 directors’ discretion over where to locate the 
branches,151 a competing state interest in keeping branches out of the 
state,152 and a state’s attempt to negate the statutorily authorized action of 
the directors.153 
Maryland argued, inter alia, that even if Congress possessed the power 
to place a bank in one of the states, Congress should determine the place-
ment of that bank before a state may be precluded from exercising its sov-
ereign power over that placement.154 Essentially, arguing before the Su-
preme Court shortly after the founding era of our nation, Maryland raised 
Rubenstein’s exact position: that actions by statutory delegates of federal 
power cannot limit a state’s exercise of its own sovereign power.155 In the 
words of Joseph Hopkinson, the lead attorney for Maryland,  
Congress is . . . the only [tribunal] in which [the power to override state sovereign power] 
may be safely trusted; the only one in which the States to be affected by the measure, are all 
fairly represented. If this power belongs to Congress, it cannot be delegated to the directors 
of a bank, any more than any other legislative power may be transferred to any other body of 
citizens . . . . The establishment of a bank in a State, without its assent; without regard to its   
 145 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819).  
 146 The Bank existed for only twenty years, dying when President Andrew Jackson refused to 
renew the charter. Harold J. Plous & Gordon E. Baker, McCulloch v. Maryland: Right Principle, Wrong 
Case, 9 STAN. L. REV. 710, 712 (1957). 
 147 Id. at 717.  
 148 Id.  
 149 An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266, § 11, 
¶ 14 (1816).  
 150 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 334. 
 151 Lest one view locating branches of the bank as unimportant, see MASHAW, supra note 58, at 47, 
which treats as significant that, for the First Bank of the United States, “all of the Bank’s operating 
policies—including when and where to establish branches—were left to the regulations to be adopted by 
the Bank’s directors . . . .”  
 152 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 335-37. 
 153 Id. at 329. 
 154 Id. at 330-31.  
 155 Id. at 360. 
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interests, its policy, or institutions, is a higher exercise of authority, than the creation of the 
parent bank; which, if confined to the seat of the government, and to the purposes of the gov-
ernment, will interfere less with the rights and policy of the States, than those wide spreading 
branches, planted every where, and influencing all the business of the community. Such an 
exercise of sovereign power, should, at least, have the sanction of the sovereign legislature to 
vouch that the good of the whole requires it, that the necessity exists which justifies it.156 
Under Rubenstein’s theory, Congress cannot delegate the power to lo-
cate a branch of the bank if the exercise of such power is inconsistent with 
state law.157 Even after the decision to locate a branch is made by the agen-
cy, if a state later disagrees, then Rubenstein’s position would require Con-
gress to revisit the bill and specifically authorize the preemption.158  
Chief Justice John Marshall, however, rejected Maryland’s reasoning 
as follows:  
If we apply the principle for which the State of Maryland contends, to the constitution gener-
ally, we shall find it capable of changing totally the character of that instrument. We shall 
find it capable of arresting all the measures of the government, and of prostrating it at the 
foot of the States. The American people have declared their constitution, and the laws made 
in pursuance thereof, to be supreme; but this principle would transfer the supremacy, in fact, 
to the States. 
  If the States may tax one instrument, employed by the government in the execution of its 
powers, they may tax any and every other instrument. They may tax the mail; they may tax 
the mint; they may tax patent rights; they may tax the papers of the custom-house; they may 
tax judicial process; they may tax all the means employed by the government, to an excess 
which would defeat all the ends of government. This was not intended by the American peo-
ple. They did not design to make their government dependent on the States.159  
 
Thus, in the first case to test the supremacy of federal over state law, Chief 
Justice Marshall recognized how debilitating it would be if an agency, au-
thorized to act by statute, had to go back to Congress every time it sought to 
implement the statute in a manner that conflicts with state law.160  
One might object to our characterization of McCulloch as preemption 
by administrative action. The statute approved the Bank charter, which in 
turn authorized establishing branches as directors saw fit.161 Although the 
direct conflict with Maryland law was engendered by the directors creating 
a Baltimore branch, certainly Congress understood and had authorized the 
establishment of branches within state boundaries, and not just in the Dis-
trict of Columbia or federal territories.162 Thus, one might instead character-
ize preemption of state taxation or regulation of branches of the Bank as 
explicitly authorized by Congress. This latter characterization would pro-
  
 156 Id. at 336-37. 
 157 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1129. 
 158 Id. at 1129-30.  
 159 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 432. 
 160 Id. at 327-29. 
 161 An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266, § 11, 
¶ 14 (1816). 
 162 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 399-400.  
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vide some support for Clark’s view that preemption by federal regulation 
follows from congressional intention, especially if one believed that all 
delegations involved actions directly envisioned by Congress.163 This char-
acterization might also lead to a limited notion of administrative preemp-
tion—applying such preemption only when something like the particular 
preemptive regulation was contemplated in the text of the statute. But draw-
ing a line between a preempting exercise of discretion that is executive in 
nature and that which is policy oriented (and thus must be left to Congress) 
calls for the precise determination that the Court has refused to make in the 
context of nondelegation challenges to agency exercises of power.164 Even 
Justice Scalia, who formally distinguishes between exercises of executive 
and legislative discretion, has admitted that having the courts draw a line 
between the two is infeasible.165  
2. The Progress Clause and the Patent Act of 1790 
In addition, other examples of administrative preemption undermine 
any claim that such preemption is limited to agency choices that could be 
envisioned by Congress. In particular, the early history of the patent system 
in the United States countermands such a limited reading of executive 
preemptive power.166 Although the notes on the Constitutional Convention 
do not explain why the framers drafted the Progress Clause of the Constitu-
tion as they did,167 there is manifest evidence that the framers saw the power 
as imperative if the United States was to take advantage of scientific inven-
tion.168  
  
 163 See Clark, supra note 6, at 1435-36. 
 164 See John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1541, 
1543-44 (2008) (asserting that the Court has declined to enforce the nondelegation doctrine because of 
“anxiety about its own competence to judge when a statute is so vague or open-ended that it effectively 
transfers legislative power to an agency or court”); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 315, 321 (2000) (“[J]udicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine would raise serious 
problems of judicial competence . . . .”). 
 165 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is small 
wonder that we have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible 
degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.”). 
 166 See An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, § 1 (1790). 
 167 The “Progress Clause” grants to Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries . . . .” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The power of Congress to encourage 
the useful arts was among ten additional enumerated powers introduced by Charles Pinckney, and most 
of the debate that day centered around whether Congress could authorize standing armies. See James 
Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 18, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra 
note 29, at 324, 324-33. 
 168 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
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Because of their experience with the King of England’s grants of mo-
nopolies, colonists generally were skeptical of such grants.169 After gaining 
independence, however, states saw encouragement of technological devel-
opment and artistic expression as exceptions that warranted these grants.170 
Thus states commonly granted monopolies to those within their boundaries 
responsible for invention, importation, or effective development of techno-
logical breakthroughs.171 During the period under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, Congress recognized the importance of encouraging such develop-
ment, and passed a resolution recommending that the states develop copy-
right systems.172 Technology such as the steamship, however, greatly im-
proved the ease with which producers could move goods from one locale to 
another, and even from one state to another. This mobility of goods threat-
ened the efficacy of state-by-state grants of monopolies over new technolo-
gy.173 State-granted monopolies were not of great value if individuals in one 
state could simply go to a neighboring state to obtain goods whose produc-
tion relied on the new technology. Competing claims to the right to use a 
technology interfered with the development of the technology. Developers 
of uses for technology therefore rushed to obtain patents from several states 
before potential competitors might beat them to it.174 Furthermore, different 
state standards for granting patents meant that different developers received 
patents for the same technology in different states, which fueled continued 
controversy over development rights.175  
The inefficiency of having to file in several states and the deterrent ef-
fect of competing patent claims on technological development discouraged 
the utility of state patents and was a major impetus for the inclusion of the 
power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”176 in Article 
  
 169 VICTOR S. CLARK, HISTORY OF MANUFACTURES IN THE UNITED STATES: 1607-1860, at 52 
(1916) (noting pure monopoly grants for industries dying out in the colonies by 1750). 
 170 Id. at 49. 
 171 WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 104-06 
(2d ed. 1829) (“In some of the states, prior to the adoption of the general Constitution, acts of the legis-
lature in favour of meritorious discoveries and improvements, had been passed; but their efficacy being 
confined to the boundaries of the states, was of little value, and there can be no doubt that, as soon as 
congress legislated on the subject, (which was as early as the second session, 1790,) all the state provi-
sions ceased . . . .”). 
 172 Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (5 
Part I), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 615, 636 (1996). 
 173 Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the U.S. Patent Law: Antecedents (5, Part II), 
78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 665, 668-71 (1996) (stating that the earliest known multistate 
patent grant was in 1779 to Henry Guest, inventor of a process to make currier’s oil). 
 174 Id. at 672-84 (tracing the patent race between John Fitch, James Rumsey, and Arthur Donaldson 
regarding the steamboat).  
 175 Id. at 673, 675 (Rumsey was granted patents in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania for his 
“stream boat,” but not in New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Further, 
Fitch obtained patents for a steamboat in Pennsylvania and Virginia, but not Maryland).  
 176 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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I’s enumeration of Congress’s power.177 The point, however, should not be 
overstated.178 States’ continued issuance of patents after the Constitution 
was ratified suggests that the Constitution did not mean to prohibit states 
from granting monopoly rights to develop technology.179 But state powers 
to grant such rights were distinct from federal powers. States often granted 
monopoly rights to a person who imported an existing new technology to 
the state from overseas or who promised to develop such existing new tech-
nologies most efficaciously,180 but the federal patent system focused on 
initial invention.181 The most accepted reading of the Progress Clause al-
lows Congress to grant exclusive use rights for limited periods only to in-
ventors.182 Although this is a more limited power than that generally recog-
nized as being within the power of the sovereign states, the impetus for the 
power left no doubt that when a federal patent conflicted with a state-
granted license, the state license had to yield.183  
With respect to the thesis of this Article, the most interesting point 
about the early federal patent power is contained in the Patent Act of 1790, 
enacted during the second session of the First Congress.184 That Act author-
ized the secretary of state, the secretary of the department of war, and the 
attorney general to determine whether the patent applicant “invented or 
discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any 
improvement therein and not before known or used.”185 If that was so, then 
a patent was to be granted if any two of the cabinet officials “deem[ed] the 
invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important.”186 In essence, the 
grant of a patent did not simply entail the application of objective standards, 
but rather depended on the discretion of the officials named over matters 
  
 177 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 239 (James Madison) (E. H. Scott ed. 1898) (“The States 
cannot separately make effectual provision for [the right of inventors to their inventions] . . . .”); 3 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1147 (1833) (“[I]nventors . . . would have 
been subjected to the varying laws and systems of the different states on [patents] . . . .”). 
 178 See generally Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 45, 48 (2013) (arguing that states shared concurrent patent powers with the federal govern-
ment that encouraged the development of useful inventions). 
 179 STORY, supra note 177, § 1149 (“[T]here does not seem to be the same difficulty in affirming, 
that, as the power of congress extends only to authors and inventors, a state may grant an exclusive right 
to the possessor or introducer of an art or invention, who does not claim to be an inventor, but [has] 
merely introduced it from abroad.”). 
 180 Hrdy, supra note 178, at 48.  
 181 See STORY, supra note 177, § 1148. 
 182 See id. at §§ 1148-49.  
 183 But see Hrdy, supra note 178, at 72-73. 
 184 An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
 185 Id. § 1.  
 186 Id.  
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that Congress could not have considered in passing the Act.187 Thus, one of 
the early acts of the First Congress delegated to administrative officials the 
discretion to make law that would preempt conflicting state law.  
3. State Control Over Waterways and Gibbons v. Ogden  
The power of federal officials to issue decisions that preempt state law 
also played a role in the Court’s first Commerce Clause challenge to state 
law. In Gibbons v. Ogden,188 the Court considered whether the state could 
enforce an exclusive right for use of steamboats in state waters against a 
ship that was licensed for coasting under federal law.189 The state law had 
forbidden any steam vessel from operating within New York without ob-
taining a license from the exclusive patent holders Livingston and Fulton.190 
The federal statute directed a “collector” to issue licenses to vessels to be 
employed in the coasting trade if they met particular statutory criteria.191 By 
modern standards, the collector’s determination would be viewed as an 
agency adjudication.  
As mentioned earlier,192 early nineteenth century congressional acts 
were far more specific than most modern agency delegations, and the feder-
al licensing statute at issue did not leave much discretion to the collector.193 
Nonetheless, the license was issued by the collector, and, as this case illus-
trates, could potentially interfere with state law. In the New York Court of 
Appeals, prior to the case reaching the Supreme Court, the state argued that 
the statute authorizing the license simply established a means of collecting 
revenue in return for permission to engage in the coasting trade on terms 
more favorable than those allowed to foreign vessels.194 The New York 
  
 187 MASHAW, supra note 58, at 50 (characterizing the discretion exercised by the original Patent 
Office as “quasi-judicial,” even opining that this Office was “America’s first flirtation with the inde-
pendent commission”).  
 188 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 189 Id. at 2-3.  
 190 Id. at 1-2. 
 191 Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, § 19, 1 Stat. 305. 
 192 See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. 
 193 Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, § 19, 1 Stat. 305. 
 194 Mr. Emmet arguing on behalf of New York advocated the following:   
The registering, recording, and enrolling of vessels, were enacted by the act on that subject, 
passed September 1st, 1789. They were for the purpose of describing the vessel, her built, 
tonnage, and ownership; and neither they, nor their certificates, give, nor purport to give, any 
right to trade. . . . Registered or enrolled vessels, on application to the collector where they 
belonged, were entitled to receive a license to trade between the different districts in the 
United States, or carry on the bank or whale fishery for one year. The meaning of that li-
cense, notwithstanding the generality of its language, was only to certify that the proper ton-
nage duty for that year had been paid; and that the vessel was licensed, for that year, to trade 
without paying any tonnage duty. 
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 133-34 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
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court agreed.195 It considered the exclusive right to use steamships on state 
waters to be a property right, and reasoned that the license issued by the 
collector did not affect that right.196 Interestingly, however, the state court 
treated the effect of the license as stemming from the act of the collector, 
not of Congress. The court, however, did not justify its decision by claim-
ing that the collector could not preempt state law,197 even though such justi-
fication would have been an obvious rationale had the state court under-
stood the Supremacy Clause to operate as Rubenstein does.  
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall was 
not persuaded by the contention that Congress did not mean to confer 
preemptory power upon the agency. After determining that Congress had 
authority to regulate shipping and carriage of passengers between states and 
to fish the waters off the coast,198 the Court determined that the federal li-
cense authorized ships to engage in these activities.199 In response to the 
contention that Congress had not intended for licensing to authorize use of 
steam vessels in contravention of state law, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned 
that the statute included steamboats because the statute referred to vessels 
generally and did not create an exemption for locomotion by steam.200 It did 
not matter whether Congress envisioned the statute covering steamboats 
contravening state law. The fact that Congress had the power to regulate in 
contravention of state law and had authorized the collector to license steam-
ships to ply New York’s waters was sufficient for the license to preempt the 
state statute.201  
  
 195 Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Johns. 488, 510 (N.Y. 1820), rev’d, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 196 The state court declared,  
Any person in the assumed character of owner, may obtain the enrolment and license re-
quired, but it will still remain for the laws and courts of the several states to determine the 
right and title of such assumed owner, or of some other person, to navigate the vessel. The li-
cense only gives to the vessel an American character, while the right of the individual procur-
ing the license to use the vessel as against another individual setting up a distinct and exclu-
sive right, remains precisely as it did before. It is neither enlarged nor diminished by means 
of the license; the act of the collector does not decide the right of property. He has no juris-
diction over such a question. 
Id. at 494.  
 197 Id.  
 198 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 211. 
 199 Id. at 212-13.  
 200 Id. at 219-20. Chief Justice Marshall also determined from legislation passed after the licensing 
statute that Congress had in fact intended the statute to cover steam vessels. See id. at 221 (“This act 
demonstrates the opinion of Congress, that steam boats may be enrolled and licensed . . . for every 
commercial purpose authorized by the laws of the Union; and the act of a State inhibiting the use of 
either to any vessel having a license under the act of Congress, comes, we think, in direct collision with 
that act.”). But this determination was an alternative rationale, and the opinion makes clear that even if 
Congress had not so envisioned, the fact that the statute authorized the collector’s licensing of steam 
vessels was sufficient for the license to have preemptive effect. In other words, even if the collector had 
discretion about the types of ships to license, that would not diminish the preemptive effect of his deci-
sion. 
 201 Id. at 239-40. 
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Chief Justice Marshall also opined on the impact of the position of 
those, like Rubenstein, who would interpret federal powers narrowly to 
avoid contravention with state law.202 After deciding the case, the Gibbons 
Court went on to warn, 
Powerful and ingenious minds, taking, as postulates, that the powers expressly granted to the 
government of the Union, are to be contracted by construction, into the narrowest possible 
compass, and that the original powers of the States are retained, if any possible construction 
will retain them, may, by a course of well digested, but refined and metaphysical reasoning, 
founded on these premises, explain away the constitution of our country, and leave it, a mag-
nificent structure, indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use.203 
It is as if Chief Justice Marshall anticipated Rubenstein’s proposition that 
federal agencies should not have the power to overrule even directly con-
flicting state law when he explained that such a narrowing of the reach of 
federal law would undermine the functionality of the federal government. 
II. THE SCOPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PREEMPTION 
Thus far, this Article has demonstrated that Rubenstein’s understand-
ing of the preemptive effect of agency action is untenable as a means of 
establishing a workable government, as well as a matter of historical under-
standing.204 This Article has further demonstrated that Clark’s understand-
ing of the preemptive effect of agency action is in tension with his reading 
of “Laws of the United States.”205 Together, these findings suggest that the 
better reading of “Laws of the United States” would include agency discre-
tionary decisions, including orders and regulations. This Part of the Article 
turns now to develop the significance of this reading for the various ways in 
which discretionary agency action might preempt state law.  
A. Administrative Conflict Preemption 
Given this Article’s conclusion that administrative regulations come 
within the “Laws of the United States . . . made in Pursuance [of the Consti-
tution],” there is no formal reason to treat preemption by conflict of state 
law with federal regulation differently from statutory conflict preemption. If 
it is impossible for a regulated entity simultaneously to comply with state 
law and validly adopted federal regulations, that such regulations count as 
  
 202 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1164-65.  
 203 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 222. 
 204 See supra Parts I.B.2, I.B.4.  
 205 See supra Part I.B.3. 
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federal law warrants treating them as controlling over state law.206 The fact 
that Congress may not have envisioned regulations preempting state law 
does not matter. Congress frequently does not envision the regulations that 
agencies adopt, yet those regulations are still valid and enjoy the force of 
law. 207  
The same argument applies to state laws that frustrate the purposes of 
federal regulation—essentially administrative obstacle preemption. Even 
statutory obstacle preemption is controversial because it requires courts to 
identify the purposes of a statute and evaluate whether state law so frus-
trates them that the law should be deemed preempted.208 Nonetheless, the 
general view recognizes the need for obstacle preemption because without 
it states would have great leeway to pass laws that undermine federal pro-
grams.209 Administrative obstacle preemption actually avoids many of the 
problems with statutory obstacle preemption. Agencies must justify their 
regulatory decisions,210 and therefore provide a detailed rationale on which 
courts can rely to evaluate the effect of state laws on federal regulatory pro-
grams.211 Agency regulations are not merely the bare text of the regulation; 
they include gloss from the agency’s justification for them.212 Hence, courts 
  
 206 The Supreme Court has held that state law is preempted when a regulated entity cannot comply 
with such law and federal agency regulations, even in the absence of a statutory preemption provision. 
See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2013); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 
529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000) (holding that state tort suits based on a standard that would conflict with 
federal regulations are preempted even though the statutory preemption provision did not preempt such 
suits).  
 207 See Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption and Choice-of-Law Coordination, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 647, 649 (2013) (“Congress cannot foresee all possible preemption scenarios or 
perfectly articulate the effect of its laws in all situations.”). 
 208 See Note, Preemption as Purposivism’s Last Refuge, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1066-67 (2013) 
(describing the problems posed by the need to determine statutory purpose to resolve questions of obsta-
cle preemption). Justice Thomas sees the problems as so significant that he refuses to recognize obstacle 
preemption at all. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 604 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  
 209 See Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View from the Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 
1257, 1263 (2010) (arguing that obstacle preemption serves the important role of protecting “federal law 
and federal regulatory programs in all of their myriad forms from interference by state and local gov-
ernments”).  
 210 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43-44 (1983) (mandating that agencies engage in reasoned decision making when adopting 
rules); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 415 (1971) (requiring a 
reviewing court to ensure that the agency considered relevant factors before acting).  
 211 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n., 463 U.S. at 44-45. 
 212 In notice and comment rulemaking, the Administrative Procedure Act requires that “the agency 
shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.” 5 U.S.C. § 
553(c) (2006). Courts have essentially “replaced the statutory adjectives ‘concise’ and ‘general’ with the 
judicial adjectives ‘detailed’ and ‘encyclopedic.’” 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 7.4, at 596 (5th ed. 2010). Nonetheless, the fact that these explanations are “incorporated” 
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often will have more detailed and reliable information about the purposes of 
regulations, and how the agency envisioned furthering those purposes. At 
the same time, given that implementation of regulatory programs usually 
depends on the agency adopting regulations or issuing orders, the concern 
that an overly restrictive conception of conflicting state laws will threaten 
federal programs is just as strong when applied to regulatory schemes as to 
statutory ones. Therefore, courts have every reason to apply obstacle 
preemption to federal regulations.  
Those who worry about agencies running roughshod over state inter-
ests raise pragmatic concerns about administrative preemption. They be-
lieve that agencies do not have the institutional capacity to consider federal-
ism issues,213 that agencies will be biased in their consideration of such is-
sues,214 or that states have more influence over legislation than they do over 
regulatory outcomes.215 Some scholars are simply concerned that adminis-
trative preemption makes it too easy to displace state law.216 Although these 
normative concerns extend beyond the general positive focus of this Arti-
cle, we provide a summary rejoinder to demonstrate that our reading of the 
Supremacy Clause is workable, and in fact comports to a large extent with 
current preemption doctrine.  
Because states usually are well-represented repeat players in adminis-
trative policymaking, agencies generally take state interests in particular 
agency programmatic issues into account.217 The administrative regulatory 
  
into the rule justifies courts relying on them to determine the scope and purpose of a rule that might 
preempt state law. 
 213 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Unlike Congress, administrative agencies are clearly not designed to represent the interests of States . . 
. .”); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 721 
(2008) (“[A]gencies do not seem to possess the expertise or institutional focus to decide when state laws 
are appropriately preempted.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. 
L. REV. 727, 756 (2008) (“[A]gencies know little about constitutional law . . . .”).  
 214 See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 213, at 722; Merrill, supra note 213, at 756. 
 215 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Perils of Preemption, 44 TRIAL 20, 24 (2008) (arguing that 
states’ use of Congress to limit agency preemption is there most effective resource while admitting that 
a legislative solution is institutionally impractical); Mendelson, supra note 213, at 721 (“The failure of 
agencies to consider the value of state autonomy and involvement unfortunately appears to be typical.”). 
 216 See, e.g., Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 50 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 805, 832-33 (1998) (“[E]ven if a majority of the states’ representatives in Congress believe that 
preemption will unduly trammel state authority, an agency may nonetheless choose [it].”); Mendelson, 
supra note 213, at 706 (“[A] presumption against agency preemption . . . makes sense because it reduces 
the risk that agencies will possess excessive power to preempt state law . . . .”); Merrill, supra note 213, 
at 756 (“Agencies may also pose a greater threat to stability in the division of authority [between the 
federal government and states], given that they are prone to policy shifts with changes in administration 
and can act to implement policy shifts much more quickly than Congress or the courts.”). 
 217 See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1973 (“[A]gencies’ abilities to assess programmatic 
federalism values more accurately than courts or Congress will outweigh any bias in their federalism 
considerations . . . .”); Metzger, supra note 135, at 2075 (“Numerous factors, such as congressional 
oversight, federal officials’ ties to state regulators, lobbying by state political organizations, and depend-
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process is more transparent, and arguably even more accountable, than the 
legislative process. Agency action is also subject to greater judicial scrutiny 
on review than are statutes, which can be struck down only if they violate 
the Constitution.218 These attributes of administrative action further alleviate 
concerns that federal regulators will unreasonably discount state interests.219 
Finally, the ease with which agencies can displace state law is not problem-
atic if such displacement is needed for a national solution to a regulatory 
problem when such a solution is appropriate.220 Thus, there are normative 
arguments to back up this Article’s positive conclusion that agency regula-
tions should preempt state law based on their independent legal force. 
Moreover, with respect to conflict preemption, our position is consistent 
with existing doctrine: courts generally find conflict preemption based on 
federal regulations just as they do for federal statutes.221 
B. Jurisdictional Preemption  
Courts have been hesitant to permit agencies to invoke jurisdictional 
preemption—that is, to explicitly preempt state law by regulation.222 Courts 
that have recognized such preemption have required that the statute author-
izing agency action explicitly empower the agency to preempt state law,223 
  
ence on state implementation, can all serve to give state regulatory interests leverage in federal agency 
decisionmaking.”). 
 218 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (setting judicial deference standards for the review of agency ac-
tions). 
 219 Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1955-61 (discussing agency transparency); id. at 1979-84 
(discussing accountability advantages of agencies because they can react more quickly to changes in the 
values of the electorate than can Congress). 
 220 Id. at 1986-94 (noting that agency deliberation can give courts reviewing agency action a better 
idea of when a national solution is warranted); Metzger, supra note 135, at 2073 (“[T]he focus [of any 
inquiry into administrative federalism] . . . must be on ensuring that federal officials adequately consider 
and justify decisions that harm state interests, not that they forego such decisions altogether.”). 
 221 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000) (“The basic question, then, is wheth-
er a common-law ‘no airbag’ action like the one before us actually conflicts with [the Department of 
Transportation regulation at issue]. We hold that it does.”). 
 222 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274-75 (2006) (“[W]e conclude the [federal regulation 
in question] does not authorize the Attorney General to bar dispensing controlled substances for assisted 
suicide in the face of a state medical regime permitting such conduct.”). 
 223 See Nat’l Ass’n. Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422, 429 (1989) (rejecting FCC 
preemption of state regulation of inside wiring because “the FCC may not use its preemptive powers in 
a manner that would negate the lawful exercise of state authority over intrastate service”); see also 
Sunstein, supra note 164, at 331 (“[A]dministrative agencies will not be allowed to interpret ambiguous 
provisions so as to preempt state law.”). This insistence has led to some confusing Supreme Court 
opinions. For example, in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N. A., the majority concluded that regulations of 
the Office of the Controller of the Currency (“OCC”) preempted application of state laws providing the 
power of state regulators to inspect the operations of an affiliate of a national bank. 550 U.S. 1, 14-17 
(2007). The Court, however, conceded that the Act authorizing the OCC regulations did not itself 
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and even then some judges and commentators have doubted whether Con-
gress can authorize explicit agency preemption.224 But if regulations are 
“Laws of the United States” within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause, 
then courts should not require congressional authorization of preemption. It 
should be sufficient that agency regulations are valid regardless of their 
preemptive effect, which requires only that the agency was authorized to 
regulate generally and did so with sufficient consideration of all affected 
interests, including those of the states. 
Those who advocate resistance norms to protect federalism interests 
might question whether general regulatory authority should be sufficient to 
authorize explicit regulatory preemption. That is, even if regulations are 
laws made in pursuance of the Constitution, regulations that preempt might 
be presumed to be beyond an agency’s power unless Congress has explicit-
ly authorized preemption.225 But, this presumption becomes untenable once 
one recognizes that an agency might choose private ordering and market 
mechanisms unimpeded by regulation as its preferred regulatory ap-
proach.226 In such a situation, administrative preemption essentially imple-
ments the agency’s regulatory choice, and hence is a form of regulation 
encompassed within a grant of general rulemaking authority.227 This under-
standing of preemption as regulation, however, easily extends to situations 
beyond laissez faire regulatory schemes. When an agency explicitly 
preempts state law, it is signaling that its regulation reflects a balance that 
  
preempt state law, and there is no provision authorizing OCC regulations to preempt state law. Id. The 
majority relied instead on Congress’s authorization of national banks to engage in mortgage lending via 
affiliates, and characterized OCC regulations as merely codified Congress’s understanding that affiliates 
were to be treated as national banks. Id. In essence, the Court was forced to rely on an implicit meaning 
of the statute that both did not preempt state law and yet was equivalent to federal regulations that did 
preempt state law.  
 224 See Sunstein, supra note 164, at 331 n.81. Professor Sunstein reads Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), to suggest that Congress cannot delegate certain decisions, such as whether 
to preempt state law, to agencies. Id. at 336-37 (but expressing doubt that the principle would prevent 
Congress from delegating authority to preempt if it does so expressly).  
 225 See generally Benjamin & Young, supra note 4, at 2115; cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Federal-
ism Decisions of Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor: Is Half a Loaf Enough?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1793, 
1803-04 (2006) (criticizing the Court as forfeiting coherence by relegating resistance of federal domi-
nance of the regulatory arena to applications of administrative law and statutory interpretation). 
 226 The dichotomy between private ordering via markets as an alternative to traditional government 
regulation is well established. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 947, 947 (1984) (“The persistent tension between private ordering and government regulation 
exists in virtually every area known to the law . . . .”); James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepre-
neurial Response, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1187, 1191 n.7 (2007) (“[M]arket-oriented scholars have argued 
that a system of private ordering . . . is preferable to mandatory federal regulation.”). 
 227 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1018-19 (2010) 
(describing “null preemption” as involving a difference between state and federal governments about 
whether market forces are preferable to regulation with respect to some problem within the jurisdiction 
of both governments, but arguing that it is rarely justified). 
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would be upset by any state regulation. Hence, explicit regulatory preemp-
tion merely facilitates the implementation of the agency’s general regulato-
ry authority.  
We do not mean to suggest that agency jurisdictional preemption does 
not warrant some sort of heightened judicial oversight. The federal structure 
of our government warrants ensuring that agencies take state interests seri-
ously before acting to significantly affect those interests.228 An agency 
should encourage state participation in the regulatory process before choos-
ing to preempt state law. Furthermore, whether or not Congress has speci-
fied that agencies should consider state interests in rulemaking, such inter-
ests are inherently relevant factors that a court can demand an agency take 
into account.229 A reviewing court would thus be correct to reverse agency 
preemption as arbitrary and capricious if the agency failed to explain why 
preemption was necessary to implement its substantive policy.230 In addi-
tion, Congress can limit the authority of an agency to issue regulations that 
jurisdictionally preempt state law because agencies have only the authority 
that their organic statutes give them.231 But absent such an explicit limita-
tion, under our reading of the Constitution, a court would be wrong to re-
verse administrative jurisdictional preemption as inherently beyond the 
agency’s authority.  
Field preemption, however, is a different matter. Essentially, field 
preemption occurs when courts read the comprehensive nature of a statute 
as evidence of intent to preclude any regulation within the statute’s ambit 
despite Congress having failed to express such an intent.232 Statutory legiti-
  
 228 See Metzger, supra note 135, at 2073-76 (discussing the need for balance among federal and 
state interests). 
 229 See William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest 
for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1567 (2009) (“[T]he 
underlying triggers for traditional hard look review . . . are present when agencies declare preemptive 
power and effect.”); Mark Seidenfeld, Who Decides Who Decides: Federal Regulatory Preemption of 
State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 611, 645-49 (2010) (explaining how notice and comment 
procedures and hard look review can ameliorate any shortcomings in agency consideration of state 
regulatory interest); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 
DUKE L.J. 2125, 2186 (2009) (advocating hard look review of agency assertions of preemption because 
“[c]ourts are well poised to police agencies’ flouting of their responsibilities in the domains of regulato-
ry review and interpretation”). 
 230 See Buzbee, supra note 229, at 1569-70 (arguing that hard look review would require an agency 
to engage and be responsive to state interests and “to grapple with criticisms and counter-arguments [to 
preemption]”).  
 231 Theodore B. Olson, Restoring the Separation of Powers, 7 REG. 19, 29 (1983) (“In organic 
statutes, Congress can—and undoubtedly should—place more specific and precise limits on agency 
authority to issue rules . . . .”). 
 232 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“The scheme of federal regula-
tion may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.”). See also Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 
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macy, however, derives from passage of a text by the constitutionally speci-
fied process and therefore does not depend on Congress providing any ex-
planation for the basis for the statute.233 For this reason, courts do not re-
quire Congress to provide any reasons for how it structures the statutes it 
passes.234 Essentially, in finding field preemption, courts reason from the 
text of the statute, perhaps supported by some references in legislative his-
tory, to infer broad intent for federal law to be exclusive.235  
The legitimacy of administrative action, by contrast, depends on that 
action being supported by reasoned explanation to ensure against arbitrary 
action.236 Courts are not simply to look at the text of the regulations to de-
termine whether they are valid, or even the extent of their reach.237 This is 
precisely why obstacle preemption is less problematic when done by regu-
lation than by statute. This different font of legitimacy for administrative 
action, however, works against the recognition of field preemption based on 
agency regulation covering the entire arena to be regulated. If an agency 
intends to occupy a regulatory field, our legal system expects the agency to 
state that intention explicitly and to explain the scope of that intention, as 
well as a justification, for the agency to exercise its regulatory power in a 
preemptive manner.238 
In short, to be legitimate, exercises of regulatory power must not only 
be authorized, they must be justified in terms of the matter confronting the 
  
176 (2011) (noting that field preemption can be based on “detailed legislation targeting a particular 
industry or form of conduct”). 
 233 Thus, the Affordable Care Act was upheld as within Congress’s taxing power despite the fact 
that Congress consistently asserted that the penalty in the Act was not a tax. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. 
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012) (“The ‘question of the constitutionality of action taken by 
Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.’” (quoting Woods v. 
Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948))); see also Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. 869, 874 (2008) (opining that the question of statutory construction “is the issue at the 
heart of every preemption case”). 
 234 See, e.g., Benjamin & Young, supra note 4, at 2131-35.  
 235 Id. 
 236 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 44-46 (1983) (delineating the reasoned decision-making standard of review of agency action); 
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative 
State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 533 (2003) (arguing that the reasoned decision-making standard of review 
under ordinary administrative law is necessary to justify agency authority constitutionally). 
 237 As the Court stated in its first Chenery decision,  
If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is 
authorized to make and which it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do ser-
vice for an administrative judgment. For purposes of affirming no less than reversing its or-
ders, an appellate court cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively en-
trusted to an administrative agency.  
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). 
 238 See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 2011 (arguing that agencies should only be able to 
jurisdictionally preempt state law by legislative rulemaking subject to hard look review). Of course, this 
analysis of administrative field preemption does not preclude a court from attributing field preemption 
to a statute that envisions comprehensive agency regulation that occupies the field. 
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agency exercising that power. The conclusion that agency regulation is law 
“arising under [the] Constitution” obviates the agency’s need to demon-
strate congressional intent that its regulation be preemptive, but still re-
quires that the agency clearly spell out how and why it invokes jurisdiction-
al preemptive regulation. 
C. Chevron and Regulatory Preemption 
The relationship of agencies to their authorizing statutes raises 
preemption issues in one context unique to agency action. Not infrequently, 
statutes hint that they mean to preempt state law, but whether they do so is 
uncertain.239 Other times, statutes explicitly preempt state law, but leave 
unclear the precise bounds of what is preempted.240 Outside of the agency 
context, most Supreme Court justices have subscribed at least nominally to 
a presumption against preemption,241 although the Court has not applied this 
presumption with much consistency or rigor.242 Judicial review of an agen-
cy’s interpretation of a statute is usually governed by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.243 which provides a competing 
rule for courts to resolve ambiguities in statutes administered by an agen-
cy.244 Chevron dictates that if such a statute does not clearly resolve a par-
ticular interpretive issue, then a court reviewing an agency action that re-
solves that issue should defer to any reasonable agency interpretation.245 
  
 239 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009) (finding congressional silence in the face 
of the awareness of the prevalence of state tort litigation implied that Congress did not mean for FDA 
approval of a drug label to preempt tort suits for inadequate labeling); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N. A., 
550 U.S. 1, 19 (2007) (holding that federal law prohibiting states from exercising visitorial powers on 
federal banks extended to a state registered subsidiary of a federal bank created to engage in mortgage 
lending). 
 240 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992). 
 241 Justice Scalia (and perhaps Justice Thomas) has expressed his belief that the clear statement 
rule disfavoring preemption should apply only to situations where any preemption is uncertain, but not 
to determining the bounds of preemption that is expressly included in a statute. The other justices, 
however, purport to follow the rule that the clear statement rule limits preemption in both contexts. See 
Jeffrey R. Stern, Preemption Doctrine and the Failure of Textualism in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 80 
VA. L. REV. 979, 1001-02 (1994) (describing the justices stated positions regarding the presumption 
against preemption in Cipollone). 
 242 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 
1256, 1303 (2009) (“The Court’s readiness to find field preemption and its capacious view of what 
constitutes an obstacle for purposes of conflict preemption have led some commentators to argue that 
there is a presumption in favor of preemption, despite the Court’s refrain to the contrary.”). 
 243 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 244 Id. at 842-43.  
 245 Id. at 843. 
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The question then becomes which takes precedence—the clear presumption 
or Chevron deference.246 
Substantive canons such as the presumption against preemption do not 
explicitly invoke congressional intent or a best reading of the words that 
Congress used.247 Hence, unlike semantic canons,248 the nature of substan-
tive canons does not suggest that they necessarily should apply at step one 
of Chevron.249 Chevron itself can be understood as a policy-based canon. It 
recognizes that, once a court determines that Congress did not clearly re-
solve a particular matter by statute, resolution of that matter involves policy 
rather than legal judgment, and that therefore such determinations are more 
appropriately made by expert and accountable agencies rather than politi-
cally insulated courts.250 Thus, substantive canons are best seen as alterna-
tives to Chevron; the question is which should apply.  
To answer that question, a court should explain in any particular con-
text whether invocation of the canon is superior to application of Chevron. 
Such explanation might focus on the extent that agencies are institutionally 
well suited to decide particular types of questions, as well as problems that 
might arise if an agency decision would trigger judicial review that could 
affect matters outside the agency’s jurisdiction.251 With respect to questions 
  
 246 See Gregory M. Dickinson, Calibrating Chevron for Preemption, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 667, 678-
79 (2011) (describing the tension between the canon disfavoring interpreting statutes to preempt state 
law and Chevron deference in the face of statutory ambiguity or silence). Although the Supreme Court 
has faced several cases whose facts invited it to address the relation of Chevron to the presumption 
against preemption, it has consistently declined this invitation. Id. at 668. 
 247 This creates a tension between some substantive canons and textualism. See John F. Manning, 
Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 426 (2010) (“‘[W]idely held 
social commitments’ are soft sand upon which to build a regime of clear statement rules.”); John F. 
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2419-21 (2003) (“[F]ailure to apply the 
lessons of modern intent skepticism to the absurdity doctrine calls into question the coherence of the 
textualists’ . . . objections to strong intentionalism . . . .”). Justice Scalia claims that the tension is not so 
great because such canons as clear statement rules apply to outcomes that we would not expect Congress 
to enact into law, and therefore may lead to a “no-thumb-on-the-scales” reasonable reading of statutes. 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29 (1997). 
 248 See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 
118 YALE L.J. 64, 76 (2008) (“Inquiries into the statute’s text, structure, and purpose, as well as tradi-
tional textual construction canons, fit well within [Chevron’s step one] positive inquiry . . . .”). 
 249 See Mendelson, supra note 128, at 745. But see Bamberger, supra note 248, at 77 (reporting 
that most courts see substantive canons as traditional tools that courts should use to resolve statutory 
ambiguity at step one of Chevron). 
 250 See Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 294 (2011) (“[The] 
foundation for Chevron is a self-imposed judicial restraint to avoid taking the primary role in interpret-
ing statutes when accepting that role creates a significant potential for a judge . . . to impose an interpre-
tation that furthers her policy preferences.”). 
 251 See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 2019-20 (explaining that invocation of the constitu-
tional avoidance canon within Chevron is inappropriate if the agency’s interpretation would force the 
Court to resolve a constitutional question whose impact falls almost exclusively on programs adminis-
tered by the agency that triggered the constitutional question). 
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of preemption of state law, agencies have the capability to adequately take 
account of state interests in a particular regulatory matter, and to weigh 
those against other programmatic concerns.252 Moreover, when an agency 
interprets a statute that it administers as preempting state law, that interpre-
tation would not have legal effects outside of the agency program that the 
statute authorizes.253 It is possible that a particular preemption issue might 
affect state interests so fundamentally as to rise to the level of threatening 
states as alternatives to which the polity could turn for the exercise of sov-
ereign power.254 But this is unlikely for a simple question of whether a stat-
ute addressing a particular regulatory area preempts state law.255  
The fact that administrative regulations and orders can have preemp-
tive effect without an express authorization of preemption by Congress 
supports applying Chevron to questions of whether a statute preempts fed-
eral law. From this fact it follows that interpretive questions of preemption 
are not formally different from other interpretive questions that essentially 
hinge on policy determinations. The Court has predicated Chevron on a 
presumption that Congress expects the agency to speak with the force of 
law when it issues regulations and orders.256 The same should be true when 
agency action would have the force of law with respect to preemption.257 
We want to emphasize that deference to an agency’s preemptive interpreta-
tion should not excuse the agency from explaining why preemption is war-
ranted. But once one recognizes that preemption is a policy choice that an 
agency is free to make, one cannot justify a special rule disfavoring inter-
pretations that preempt state law in the face of a clear agency interpretation 
that survives hard look review. 
  
 252 See id. at 2008-10.  
 253 See id. at 2009-13.  
 254 Essentially, if a preemption question raised a question of abstract federalism, a court might 
appropriately decline to apply Chevron. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1971-75 (but opining 
that abstract federalism is unlikely to be an issue in federalism matters agencies address and is of less 
importance to the electorate than programmatic federalism). 
 255 Id. at 2012.  
 256 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (“[I]mplementation of a particu-
lar statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authori-
ty to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation 
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”). Consistent with Mead, an 
agency interpretation regarding the preemptive effect of a statute should not get Chevron deference if 
made outside of the kind of proceeding that warrants Chevron, as opposed to Skidmore, deference.   
 257 To the extent that a court accepts our suggestion that agencies can jurisdictionally preempt state 
law only by legislative rule, an interpretation that a statute preempts state law, issued as part of an adju-
dicatory order, would not warrant Chevron deference under Mead’s rationale. See supra note 238 and 
accompanying text. Of course, substantive interpretation of a statute made in an order that has force of 
law should receive Chevron deference even if that interpretation will negate state laws that conflict or 
undermine the obstacle of the federal regulatory scheme.   
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CONCLUSION 
This Article challenges the claim that, as a matter of positive law, ad-
ministrative action falls outside the Supremacy Clause’s phrase “Laws of 
the United States . . . made in Pursuance [of the Constitution].”258 Such 
challenges derive from the work of Clark, who argues the Senate must be 
involved in adoption of any federal provision of law that preempts state 
law.259 To the extent that Clark recognizes that administrative action can 
preempt state law, his position is in tension with his fundamental argument. 
It is unrealistic to believe that Congress can predict the regulations and pol-
icies that agencies will adopt when it authorizes administrative action. 
Without awareness of future agency action, Congress cannot possibly eval-
uate the degree to which state law will interfere with federal regulation, the 
impact of preemption on state programs, or even whether future administra-
tive actions will conflict with state law. Hence, maintaining that Congress is 
responsible for administrative preemption is a legal fiction. The language of 
the Supremacy Clause and the history of inclusion of its phrase “Law of the 
United States” do not sufficiently support Clark’s reading to justify resort to 
this legal fiction.260 
Rubenstein, like us, seems to recognize the tension in Clark’s position. 
He attempts to resolve that tension by taking Clark’s argument to its logical 
conclusion—contending that administrative action, not being subject to 
Senate approval, cannot preempt state law.261 Hence Rubenstein would re-
quire Congress to certify any preemptive effect of agency action after the 
fact. Rubenstein’s proposal would require that Congress statutorily negate 
conflicting state law—an alternative to judicial enforcement of the Suprem-
acy Clause that the framers of the Constitution explicitly rejected.262 More-
over, Rubenstein’s understanding of the potential preemptive impact of 
federal administrative action is contrary to that held during the earliest 
years of the United States, as manifested by the effects given to administra-
tive actions during that period. If these reasons are not sufficient to inter 
Rubenstein’s proposal, we nail the coffin shut by illustrating that his pro-
posal would have a debilitating effect on the implementation of virtually 
every federal regulatory program—an effect that Chief Justice Marshall 
recognized in the earliest federalism cases. Based on this rejection of 
Clark’s and Rubenstein’s positions, this Article concludes that administra-
tive action can have preemptive authority in its own right, without resort to 
the fiction that authorization of such action by Congress imparts the author-
ity to preempt conflicting state law.  
  
 258 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 259 Clark, supra note 6, at 1347, 1365. 
 260 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
 261 Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 1167. 
 262 Id. at 1179.  
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This Article proceeds to explore the implications of recognizing that 
administrative action, by its own force, can have preemptive effect. Be-
cause limiting the impact of state law can be viewed as a regulatory deci-
sion, this Article concludes that agencies can both preempt conflicting state 
law and explicitly prohibit exercises of state regulation over matters within 
an agency’s rulemaking authority. The fact that administrative action, un-
like statutes, cannot be justified by appeal to arbitrary political choices, 
however, eliminates the potential for such action to preempt state law by 
occupying the regulatory field.  
 
